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Biogenetic engineering only very recently enabled 
human beings to construct Iifeforms that would be 
impossible except for scientific technology. The very 
newness of these techniques and the obvious ways in 
which the origin of "engineered" creatures derives from 
the activities of human agents allows us to think about 
questions derived from the discourse of environmental 
ethics in a new way, for they force us to ask what are 
the obligations humans owe to animals whose very 
existence derives from human agency but whose lives 
thereafter might possess intrinsic value to the animal, 
beyond the instrumental values attributed by the 
engineering perspective. 111inking about these creatures, 
how shall we answer the basic questions of 
1) whether and to what extent human obligations 
with regard to animals are owed directly to the 
animals and 
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2) what constitutes an appropriate relationship 
between culturally and technologically 
empowered human agents and a biologically 
interdependent world? 
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein l provides an early 
fictive exploration of ethical dilemmas springing from 
a realization of the scientific power to create 
bioengineered species. Through the characteristics 
given Dr. Frankenstein and his creature, the novel 
provides a fictive platform for analyzing both what 
we take to be loci of value sufficient to command 
human respect and the manner in which such matters 
are to be decided. 
The Novel 
Originally conceived as an entertaining horror story, 
this 19th-century work begins with a young man who 
seems destined to enjoy the best things in life. Possessed 
of good health, a loving family, devoted friends and 
economic security, he is even assured that the woman 
he loves loves him in retum. Embarking on a course of 
scientific study, he wins the respect and honor of his 
colleagues and academic superiors. 
But Dr. Frankenstein wants more: he wants to 
create a new form of life. Focussing his attention only 
on this aim, he works in secret, giving no thought to a 
PHILOSOPHY 
Between the Species 
Moral Issues Associated with Bioengineered Species: Stewardship, Abuse and Sustainability 
creator's responsibilities to his creature or to the 
effect that creature's needs might have on his own 
species. Eager to break boundaries hallowed by 
culturally set limits, he dismisses these as "super-
stition." Yet, when he succeeds, the creature's 
otherness horrifies and repels him. He rejects this 
creature of his making and apparently expects it just 
to die or disappear. Such an expectation may sound 
naive, but at bottom it accurately reflects the 
assumptions about scientific mastery that presume 
scientific power enables the scientifically competent 
to control undesired consequences of scientific 
progress as well as tlle desired ones. 
The fallacy of expecting that the power to realize 
one's desires will coincide with control is fully 
demonstrated in the novel. Despite being (by human 
standards) horrifyingly ugly, the creature proves notjust 
viable but uniquely hardy and intelligent. Treated 
cruelly by every human who sees it, it understandably 
grows enraged at the species that simply assumes a right 
to abuse it. It wants a share of happiness for itself, and 
by this it means companionship from a female of its 
own kind, one who will not be horrified by its 
appearance, one who can share its activities. Finally, 
on Mont Blanc, it manages to trap its maker into facing 
squarely what he has done. "We are bound by 
indissoluble ties," the creature insists; "you must do 
your duty by me." 
Moved by the creature's arguments, Dr. Frankenstein 
assents: "For the first time I felt what the duties of a 
creator toward his creation were, and that I ought to 
render him happy"(87). He undertakes to provide the 
creature with a female of its kind. But then, on reflection, 
the doctor decides he cannot risk providing reproductive 
capacities to tllis "unnatural" being. Instead, he decides 
he must safeguard the well-being and capacity for 
happiness of his own species. As he says in summary 
toward the end of his life, 
I created a rational creature and was bound 
towards him, to a<;sure, as far as was in my 
power, his happiness and well being. This was 
my duty; but there was another still paramount 
to that. My duty towards the beings ofmy own 
species had greater claims to my attention 
because they included a greater proportion of 
happiness or misery.... I refused, and I did 
right in refusing, to create a companion for 
the first creature. (187) 
Between the Species 
But the doctor's decision to break faith with his 
reature does not break the bond between them. Instead, 
it locks creator and creation into an irremediably 
destructive relationship consuming the remainder of 
both their lives. 
Thus tlle pattern of the novel clearly raises two 
closely related questions: .• 
(l) What do hmnan beings owe to nonhuman, human-
created species; 
(2) How do such obligations weigh against those 
owed to our own human species? 
In exploring these issues, the novel moves through three 
stages. First, Dr. Frankenstein, unhindered by moral 
scruples, seeks to exercise scientific expertise without 
limit. Fearing public scrutiny might prohibit his quest, 
he conducts his experiments in secret. In simply 
arrogating to himself a private right to experiment as he 
pleases, he implicitly rips himself out of the sustaining 
nexus both of nature and ofhuman community. He gives 
absolutely no thought to the social responsibilities he 
will incur if he should, in fact, succeed. 
In stage two, confronted by a being capable of 
articulating its own needs from its own point of view, 
he becomes aware of his duty to enable this creature to 
achieve satisfaction on its own terms. He now accepts 
his creature's claim to rights and contracts in 
acknowledgement of the direct obligations owing to 
the creature. 
However, in stage three the doctor retreats to an 
antllfopocentric fear that the creature's self-sufficiency 
might prove inimical to his own species continuance. 
Moved by what he sees as species loyalty, he refuses to 
allow his creature to achieve reproductive capability. 
Dr. Frankenstein's Characteristics 
Separately and together, the stages of Frankenstein's 
story illustrate many aspects of the mainstream Western 
attitude toward nature. Dr. Frankenstein explicitly seeks 
to justify his practice by reference to the traditional 
utilitarian position that maximizing human happiness 
so far outweighs other values that the nonhuman must 
be properly regarded as just a resource for the human. 
Dr. Frankenstein seems to be working from within the 
mainstream tradition uniting the presumption that 
humans are entitled to dominate the eartll with values 
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supporting scientific progress, capitalism and what 
Lugones and Spelman2 have named cultural impelialism. 
Furthermore, altllough Dr. Frankenstein specifically 
rejects religion, his uncritical acceptance of what must 
be recognized as the presumption iliat human good is 
entitled to dominate over ilie good of tlle nonhuman-
whenever iliese are in conflict-has sources not only 
in tlle secular humanist tradition deriving from tlle 
Greeks and the scientific outlook but also in the repeated 
authorizations of ilie Old Testament. Here, male and 
female are appointed to "subdue" ilie earth and "rule 
over ilie fish in tlle sea, ilie birds of heaven and every 
living iliing iliat moves on earth" (Genesis 1:28-9). 
Humans as a species are given dominion over all 
nonhuman occupants of every environmental niche. 
However, iliis general auiliorization is transformed in 
ilie Garden of Eden story. There ilie Creator empowers 
Adam, the male human, to name all oilier creatures, 
including woman. In this version the male has primacy, 
ilie female being created to make him happy, to be his 
companion, to fulfill his need for companionship 
(Genesis 2: 19-23). 
After the Flood NOall and his sons are given ilie 
most sweeping auiliorization of all: 
Be fruitful.. .and fill tlle earth. The fear and 
dread of you shall fall upon all wild animals 
on earili, on all birds of heaven, on everytlling 
that moves upon the ground and all fish in ilie 
sea; they are given into your hands. Every 
creature iliat lives and moves shall be food for 
you; I give you tllem all, as once I gave you 
all green plants ... But you must be fruitful 
... swarm throughout the eartll and rule over 
it. (Genesis 9: 1-7) 
Rejecting religion in his commitment to rationality and 
science, Dr. Frankenstein nonetlleless unret1ectively 
accepts tlle Biblical premise which autllOrizes man, the 
male, to rule over tlle eartll, to use it and every living 
creature in every environmental niche to increase human 
thriving. His presumption is complemented by tlle 
anthropocentric premisses of tlle Greek and Roman 
world which held, as Aristotle bluntly put it, tllat "otller 
animals exist for tlle sake of man ..."3 
Dr. Frankenstein also illustrates otller aspects of tlle 
mainstream Westem attitude toward nature. In Stage I 
he is the scientific expert who assumes a right to 
unmonitored experimentation, presumably believing 
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that the quest for scientific know ledge is a self-
legitimating good. 
Life and deaili appeared to me ideal bounds 
which I should first break through, and pour a 
torrent of light into our dark world. (45) 
Because he presumes his quest good in itself, he 
unquestioningly pursues exploitation ofevery scientific 
possibility, acting as if unhindered by 
(a) any moral ret1ection on probable consequences, 
(b) any respect for the sensibilities of the non-
scientific public, or 
(c) any sense that the nonhuman might itself be 
owed respect. 
In ilie body of the novel, the first and last of these tllfee 
evasions receive explicit treatment. In Stage II the 
creature argues Dr. Frankenstein into seeing that the 
nonhuman might be owed respect. But tlle doctor, after 
promising to provide the creature wiili companionship 
of its own kind, reflects further on the probable 
consequences of this action and in Stage III comes to 
sacrifice his own chances of happiness to a moral 
heroism aimed at safeguarding humanity. Since the 
middle term, respect for the sensibilities of the 
nonscientific public, never receives its due, tlle pattern 
of obligation is never fully explored or mapped. But 
much can be learned nonetheless. 
Obligation to the Nonhuman 
Stage I 
In his total disregard of any obligations concerning 
the treatment of nonhuman beings, Frankenstein may 
be seen as a Cartesian, for Descartes so fully 
distinguished ilie body and mind tlmt animal suffering 
was considered an oxymoron. In tlle Cartesian view, 
"ilie body is regarded as a machine which, having been 
made by the hands of God, is ...better arranged"4 but 
no different in kind from machines produced by human 
ingenuity. Indeed, since only the human soul, the ghost 
in the machine, earns living human bodies special 
treatment, even hwnan bodies, lacking souls, merit little 
intrinsic respect. The evidence of tlle senses, human or 
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animal, must be rejected as untrustworthy in compatison 
with the purely rational. So, human technology-
insofar as it is applied to the nonhuman-is freed of 
nontechnical (i.e., moral) limits. 
Post-Cartesian technological progress may be 
described as the efficient use ofnatural systems viewed 
as machinery. As Susan Griffin5 has observed, this 
technological outIook promotes its own verification. 
Where mountains are seen as storehouses of coal, one 
acts reasonably when one efficientIy removes coal by 
cutting away half tile mountainside. It is an unintended 
and inconsequential side effect that the mountain erodes; 
chemicals pollute its streams; fish, plants and animals 
die. Technological enterprise fully succeeds on its own 
term-the mountain is just what Cartesian science 
believed it actually was: dead matter with a value 
adequately determined by tile price paid in tile human 
commodities market. 
P.ic~rd Huber, ~ 
.Q.f F:in.tasti·c :!.~~ ~'t'";:-_~lcl:i:=i!ol 
C:'"ea~::res. New YorI:o Dover, 
~ 
Stage II 
If Dr. Frankenstein is the scientist-technician 
bending dead matter to his will, his creature may be 
seen as tIlat estranged and technologically alienated 
Other, the nonhuman given tile fictive gift of speaking 
about its needs and potential. When they first confront 
each other on Mont Blanc, they are already caught in a 
mutually destructive pattern analogous to the destructive 
practices of industrial polluters who fill their own 
environment with carcinogens. Only here, in tile novel, 
this nonhuman, alienated otIlerexcels at self-expression. 
It articulates an alternative point of view, rejecting the 
assumption that what is not human is tIlerefore to be 
understood as dead matter. Instead, it reminds us that it 
is human ilTesponsibility that has brought us to this pass. 
Between the Species 
Were this all, the interlude on Mont Blanc might be 
seen as a call to reembrace stewardship, caring and 
concem for the nonhuman on the grounds of the ultimate 
dependence of the whole of nature on our exercise of 
rule for tile common good. From this perspective, the 
creature's charge to Doctor Frankenstein resembles Joel 
Feinberg's analysis of the duties of stewardship where 
he argues: 
Individual animals can have rights but it is 
implausible to ascribe to them a right to life 
on the human model. Nor do we normally 
have duties to keep individual animals alive 
or even to abstain from killing them provided 
we do it humanely and nonwantonly in the 
promotion oflegitimate human interests. On 
the other hand, we do have duties to protect 
threatened species, not duties to the species 
themselves as such, but rather duties to future 
human beings, duties derived from our 
housekeeping role as temporary inhabitants 
of this planet.6 
Until very recentIy, objections to tile presumption that 
natural resources are simply to be exploited without limit 
largely followed versions of this principle of indirect 
obligation, where all value remains centered on human 
instrumentality. The value of the nonhuman derives from 
the human recognition tIlat we cannot survive the loss of 
(some crucial aspects 00 an increasingly fragile biotic 
substrate. 11le rainforest is valued because it provides us 
with oxygen; the biotic diversity within it has provided 
us with pharmacological treasures; and its unknown, 
uncatalogued species might well provide future 
generations with far more than previous generations have 
already exploited. Restraint follows from the specifically 
anthropocentric perspective underlying Locke's 
constraining lie natural right to property with conditions 
rejecting wanton waste, and tile Lockean demand that 
humans leave enough for tile heritage of humankind-
quantitatively and qualitatively-as they themselves 
enjoyed. In short, constraints on our behavior with respect 
to the nonhuman ultimately detive from our estimate of 
what is owing to tile human. 
With respect to animals who display sensitivity to 
pain and suffering, the anthropocentric perspective is 
best captured by Kant's explanation of an "indirect 
obligation" which translates caring for animals into a 
duty to humans. 
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[A man] must practice kindness towards 
animals, for he who is cruel to animals 
becomes hard also in his dealings with men.? 
Indeed, even Frankenstein's creature declares itself 
willing to accept the anthropocentric perspective 
whereby obligation to the nonhuman derives indirectly 
and must accord with obligation to the human. In asking 
Dr. Frankenstein to provide it with a companion like 
itself, it describes its vision of happiness as one which 
will not injure any human. From tllat perspective it 
warns Dr. Frankenstein: 
The picture I present to you is peaceful and 
humane and you must feel that you could deny 
it only in the wantonness of power and 
cruelty.(126) 
So, the principle cited by Feinberg, tlle principle which 
requires humans to use power nonwantonly, to serve 
as stewards who benefit tlle nonhuman so as to serve 
the human, grounds tlle claim made by the creature 
on its creator. This fully accords with tlle Kantian 
principle of indirect obligation to the nonhuman. 
Humans ought to treat animals with clemency because 
to do otherwise results in a human hardening that will 
affect human-human interactions. This principle, were 
it to persist unmodified, would replace tlle criterion 
of efficient commodification with a principle of 
stewardship. The relationship of dominion would be 
interpreted as excluding exploitation but including 
nonwanton, caring use. 
We can see this as tlle better altemative inasmuch 
as human actions premised on an unlimited exploitation 
of the nonhuman have already distorted the earth's self-
regulating biotic net into mutually destructive pattems. 
However, actions premised on a duty of stewardship 
for the sake of human good, while tlley would limit 
exploitation, would in tlleir own way also distort the 
bionet. Whether agricultural practices are chemically 
dependent or utilize biological pest controls, they 
effectively change tlle environment. Domestic animals 
obviously have been molded to dependency on tlle 
human as they were bred to serve human designs. 
Naturally occurring plants have been selectively bred 
and cross-bred till tlley too depend for viability on 
human stewardship. 
Remarkably, even when the nonhuman is not 
actively molded to achieve some human good, human 
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control/stewardship has become inescapable. Today, 
even the survival of wildemess depends on human 
decisions, a form of wilderness management. 
Endangered species persist only through human 
interventions reparative of earlier human inter-
ventions. As science enables human technology to 
make the nonhuman into an other, and to distort 
further the earth's .bionet, its future sustainability 
becomes, as the creature putS it, "bound (to us) by 
indissoluble ties.~' 
But Frankenstein's creature, tllOugh it apparently 
accepts tlle anthropocentric outlook, nevertheless 
demands that its maker directly recognize its needs in 
such a way tllat this new lifeform need not remain 
within even a benevolent stewardship. Together witll 
a companion, it wishes to depart and follow its own 
lights. If it undertakes to avoid humanity so as to do 
no damage to human activity, it also proposes to be 
free from the bond of its origin, the bond of human 
stewardship which validates human dominion. Hence, 
in arguing for a chance to work out its destiny by 
means of a nonharmful independence, tlle creature 
touches on another possible way to formulate the 
obligation of humans to the nonhuman. From this 
perspective humans ought to recognize limits to tlleir 
treattnent of the nonhuman because nonhuman entities 
have claims directly on us-the principle of direct 
obligation to the nonhuman. It is this second principle 
that Aldo Leopold, ill his famous essay, "The Land 
Ethic," refers to as "a matter of biotic right."g 
Dr. Frankenstein, in this second stage of the novel, 
is challenged to face a crucial issue which in current 
ecological thinking is embodied in two radical 
alternatives: 
1) expanding tlle antluopocentric circle so tllat 
nonhumans (and exploited humans) can bOtll be 
accorded moral status and treated as recipients 
of friendship by right rather tllan by sentimental 
grant or 
2) replacing completely the anthropocentric 
principle itself. 
The challenge lies, to cite Tom Regan, in establishing 
an "ethic ofthe environment rather than an etllicfor the 
use of tlle environment.9 In posing tlle request to be 
freed from stewardship to find its own happiness, tlle 
creature calls on us to investigate 
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What loci of value command moral respect? 
Of what significance...are such characteristics 
as being alive, sentience, having interests, 
autonomy, the capacity to participate in a 
moral community, organic or systemic 
integrity and flourishing? 
Fictional though itmay be, this creature possesses every 
element which has been suggested as a locus of value 
commanding moral respect. Demonstrably alive and 
sentient, it recognizes and defends its own interests. 
For good or for evil, it exercises autonomy as humans 
do. Moreover, it demonstrates the capacity to participate 
in a moral conununity as well as an organic or systemic 
integrity and the capacity for flourishing. On this basis 
it demands of its creator no less and no more than the 
relevant necessities of its flourishing. At a minimum, it 
requires a companion, a female of its own kind. In effect, 
it asks of Dr. Frankenstein that he be as benevolent a 
creator as God was to Adam in the Garden of Eden. 
But the Creature intends to be an Adam that willingly 
chooses expulsion from that garden. It does not ask for 
Frankenstein's continued stewardship but for equal 
rights to self-determination. 
Having all of the characteristics which supposedly 
underlie the human claim to dignity and value, Le., being 
alive and sentient, possessed of intrinsic interests, 
capable ofexercising autonomy, capable ofparticipating 
in a moral community, possessed of organic or systemic 
integrity and the capacity for flourishing, the creature 
would most likely be accounted "human" on Kantian 
grounds. But Dr. Frankenstein, speaking for his time 
and very likely for our own, cannot account a creature 
of his own devising, a product of bioengineering rather 
than of human birth, as a being of intrinsic value, 
commanding respect like himself. 
Stage III 
In his ultimate denial of the creature's demands Dr. 
Frankenstein implicitly refers to the subtext of much 
current ecological debate: what do we owe future 
generations? In light of the creature's potential we must 
ask who comprises these future generations: is it only 
human future generations? 
In this regard, the creature raises issues which are 
especially relevant in light of the increasing potential 
ofbiogenetic engineering. If we create some complex 
new form of life, capable of autonomy, development 
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and participation in a moral community, what will be 
our responsibilities to this new species? Ifwe fear such 
a creature while it is still dependent on our goodwill, 
does that excuse us from the obligation to forward its 
thriving, even if we fear tllat its species thriving might 
eventually threaten the continued thriving of our own 
species, make our dominion over the nonhuman 
unsustainable, or even replace us in tlle biotic net which, 
by our own agency, is no longer independent of our 
stewardship and goodwill? 
And if an engineered life-form has some, but not 
all, of the relevant characteristics--so that it is capable 
of flourishing but incapable of participating in 
promise-keeping or the other institutions of a moral 
community-should its capacities suffice to command 
respect from us? Dr. Frankenstein's solution precludes 
the latter problem, for he chooses to privilege human 
tllfiving most of all and to deny the creature any chance 
at happiness if that poses tlle risks of reproduction and 
subsequent species independence from human control. 
TIle unfortunate doctor maintains the correctness ofhis 
choice until the very end. His choice is presented as 
heroic-a refusal to betray the greater good. Yet the 
author gives the final word to the creature, who claims 
with reason that "Blasted as thou wert., my agony was still 
superior to thine." The scientifically misshapen creation 
shows a degree of understanding superior to its maker's. 
There is in this a degree of hope and a clue to the 
persistent wrongness which, unnoticed, distorts all the 
phases of Dr. Frankenstein's development throughout 
the novel. As we noticed earlier, he unquestioningly 
pursues exploitation of scientific possibility, acting as 
if unhindered by 
a) any moral reflection on probable consequences, 
b) any respect for the sensibilities of the nonscientific 
public, or 
c) any sense that the nonhuman might itselfbe owed 
respect. 
Confronted by the creature, he is forced to acknowledge 
that at least some portion of the nonhuman might itself 
be owed respect. Persuaded to fulfill the creature's 
needs, he reconsiders and then reneges, not for personal 
gain or glory but out of species loyalty-heroically 
accepting the worst because for the first time he does 
engage in moral reflection on probable consequences. 
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However, never once throughout the novel does this 
scientific expert acknowledge or show any sensitivity 
to the sensibilities of the nonscientific public. 
Dr. Frankenstein has progressed from a paradigm of 
exploitation to one of stewardship a5 the proper mode 
by which humans would exercise dominion over the 
earth. But the question remains to be asked: do hwnans, 
per se, legitimately exercise dominion over theearth (and 
the nonhuman inhabitants thereof) either as exploiters 
or as good stewards? With respect to tllis issue, current 
practice, whether exploitive or stewardlike, reveals an 
obfuscation. Not every human is dominant over tlle eartll 
and the nonhuman. Only some, dominant groups 
instantiate that position. These dominant groups alone 
generally dominate over tlle earth, the nonhuman and 
that portion of tlle human which is not part of tlle 
dominant group. In practice, science coordinates wiili 
capitalism and "development" to promote institutions in 
which some human beings are, like much of the "natural 
world," exploited as resources for others. In order to claim 
that hwnan domination is human, the dominant group 
must falsely universalize its own position and claim iliat 
what is true of it is true of hwnans generically. 
This aspect of technological thinking can be called 
cultural imperialism. Young lO has described this process 
as marking out 
the difference of women from men, American 
Indians orAfricans from Europeans, Jews from 
Christians, homosexual from heterosexuals, 
workers from professionals ... reconstructed 
largely as deviance and inferiority. Since only 
the dominant group's cultural expressions 
receive wide dissemination, their cultural 
expressions become the ... universal, and 
thereby the unremarkable. Given tlle normality 
of its own cultural expressions and identity, 
the dominant group constructs the differences 
which some groups exhibit a5lack and negation. 
These groups become marked as Other. 
Ecofeminists bring together feminist insight into 
cultural imperialism with ecological concern for the 
environment to structure a critique of technological 
practices that tend toward the commodification of 
otherness. Unlike the ecological positions which 
promote recognition of human obligations of 
stewardship toward the nonhuman, for whatever reason, 
ecofeminists seek to establish an anti-hierarchical 
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understanding of life as an interconnected web: We are 
bound by indissoluble ties. But we must still think 
about whether our situation ought to be one of 
dominion, be it a rule of exploitation or the more 
moderate rule of stewardship. Alternatively, would it 
be better to strive for a relationship captured by some 
less hierarchical description? 
Dr. Frankenstein will not consult the superstitious 
mob whose happiness he decides to protect. His elitism 
is falsely generalized to humanity. But would the 
outcome have been different if he or the creature had 
petitioned humanity directly? 
As depicted, the nonscientific public hardly 
commands respect. It abuses the creature only because 
it perceives it as ugly. But rejection of the Other, thanks 
to a body aesthetic that produces aversive reactions, is 
not limited to Dr. Frankenstein's creature. Ageism and 
ableism are also connected wiili a deeply felt aversion 
and nervousness evoked by the presence of the old and 
the disabled in terms of a body aestlletic, a culturally 
constructed sense so pervasive that members of 
culturally imperialized groups often exhibit themselves 
symptoms of aversion toward members of their own 
and other oppressed groups. Blacks, for example, not 
infrequently differentiate in a color-valorizing manner 
between "light-skinned" and" dark-skinned." II 
If, as seems probable, the perception of ugliness is, 
wiili respect to tlle creature, a perception of otherness 
which comes so close to our own somewhat shaky 
boundaries as to evoke aversion and disgust, then the 
creature could scarcely hope for just treatment if Dr. 
Frankenstein did ask other antllropocentric, fearful 
humans to help him determine its fate. Such consultation 
would have done little more than diffuse the resultant 
guilt wiili a fallacious appeal to tlle auiliority of the many. 
However, it seems probable that the habit of non-
consultation reflects a habit of noncooperation and a 
devaluing of the positive potential of political discourse, 
a presumption of lie superiority of an expert's opinion. 
This disrespect for lie oilier, be it hwnan or nonhwnan, 
is an implicit, unremarked wrongness which ultimately 
pervades the text and distorts possibilities. Were it to be 
replaced by a willingness to cooperate with those 
characterized by "otllerness" from tlle perspective of tlle 
technologically proficient, scientifically empowered 
human, then perhaps dominion might be replaced with 
sharing in ways that would sustain us, human and 
nonhwnan, witll more compassion and clemency and 
justice tllan Dr. Frankenstein could muster. 
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A partial version of this paper was presented at 
tile TIlird Conference on Agriculture, Food and 
Human Values Society, Varieties of Sustain-
ability, Reflecting on Ethics, Environment and 
Economic Equity, Asilomar Conference Center, 
Pacific Grove, California, May 10-12, 1991. 
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I found this paper to be both instructive and 
problematic at the same time. Instructive, because 
although I had of course heard of Frankenstein, I had 
no direct acquaintance with the actual work, and this 
paper emphasized for me many issues relevant to my 
own research. TIle "problematic" aspect arose primarily 
because of the number of topics covered in the paper: 
questions concerning bioengineered species, the 
meaning of "stewardship" and of "sustainability" 
against a background of environmental abuse, finally, 
even the topic of "ecofeminism" introduced in the final 
portion of the paper. Clearly tilere are links among all 
of these topics: they are not unrelated. The question is 
how much of all of that can be usefully treated in one 
brief paper and in an even briefer response. 
Thus, in the interest ofboth brevity and focus, I will 
focus, generally speaking, primarily on the analogy 
Dandekar and Zlotowski perceive between the original 
Frankenstein and his counterparts in bioengineering 
today. Starting with a sum-up of Dandekar and 
Zlotowski's analysis of the character of the fictional 
Frankenstein, I will then turn to a brief presentation of 
the reality of today's bioteclmoIogy, before assessing 
the analogies and disanalogies. From that standpoint, I 
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